This article offers the first comprehensive scholarly response to proposals for destinationbased, cash-flow taxation (DCFT). DCFT proposals have attracted heightened public attention in 2016 because of the incorporation of one version into the US House Republican blueprint for tax reform and Donald Trump's subsequent election to the White House. They also continue to fascinate tax specialists by suggesting that corporate profit can be taxed not only in countries of 'source' or 'residence' but also (or even exclusively) in the countries where sales to final consumers occur. This article clarifies the logical structure of DCFT proposals and exposes substantial gaps between their rhetoric and technical details. I argue first that it is crucial to distinguish between two versions of the DCFT. The first version resembles proposals for taxing corporate income by sales-factoronly formulary apportionment. The second version, which is what the US House Republican blueprint proposes, resembles a destination-based value-added tax with deductions for labour costs and refundable losses. I argue that the latter version of the DCFT introduces no fundamental new option into international tax design. Instead, it may create substantial trade distortions (and its loss refund feature is also unlikely to be administrable). The first version of the DCFT does present a new option for taxing corporate profit but is un-implementable. I also highlight ways in which DCFT proposals make ad hoc normative and behavioral assumptions. Finally, the article offers a novel explanation of why it is difficult to incorporate information about consumer location into international tax design and argues that 'residence' is more promising than 'destination' (when both are understood as capturing information about natural persons) for dealing with problems arising from capital mobility.
I Introduction
The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project (BEPS), launched in July 2013 by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is now well into its fourth year.
1 As a high-profile policy initiative for combatting perceived rampant international tax avoidance by multinationals, BEPS is characterized by an agenda that has immediate and substantial bearings on taxpayers and the global tax profession. However, theoretical insights on the project, whether positive or normative, have been short in supply. It is only recently that a small body of academic literature emerged to offer evaluations of BEPS from a theoretical perspective.
2 According to one prominent strand of this academic response to BEPS, the BEPS initiative is superficial in that it deals with only the symptoms, but not the fundamental causes, of the ills in the international tax system. 3 Among writers who express this view, many have made reference to a particular proposal for reforming corporate income taxation that was first presented in the United Kingdom in 2010. 4 This is the proposal for a destination-based, cash-flow corporate tax. The key to the fascination that this reform proposal holds for both scholars and policy makers is the idea of 'destination.' Traditionally, the only options for designing international taxation of corporate income or profit have been thought to be based on either 'source' (that is, where productive activities generating the income or profits occur) or 'residence' (that is, where either the corporation, its parent, or its ultimate individual owners reside).
5 'Destination-based' corporate income, or profit, taxation suggests instead that the countries where the final sales to consumers occur that generate such income, or profits, should be allowed to levy tax. The prospect of injecting an entirely new dimension into the design of international taxation is what proposals for destination-based taxation seem to promise.
Interest in this 'radical' reform option has been expressed in policymaking circles. 6 Most importantly, in June 2016, the United States House Republican Task Force on Tax Reform released a blueprint for tax reform, 7 at the centre of which is a destination-based cash-flow tax (DCFT) to replace the current US federal income tax on corporations.
the capacity of such a tax (if adopted in the United States) to reduce US companies' incentives for international tax planning and profit shifting. 9 Moreover, the tax would allow the United States to 'leapfrog to the front of the pack' in its tax competitiveness, putting pressure on other countries to emulate. 10 Since the 2016 US presidential election resulted in the Republican Party controlling both the White House and the two chambers of the US Congress, the political viability of the United States' adoption of the DCFT is being both taken seriously by experts and widely reported in the news media.
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In this article, I offer the first comprehensive, critical response to proposals for the DCFT in both the economic and legal literatures. I examine DCFT proposals mainly from a theoretical, rather than policy, perspective and address the following questions: what are the main theoretical motivations for advocating such a tax; what are its basic mechanisms; what are the main challenges that might face its implementation; are the challenges merely technical or are they more fundamentally conceptual; and how do these challenges -whether conceptual, technical, administrative, or political -compare with the factors that might have led to all of the flaws in the existing international tax system? 12 The basic conclusion that the article comes to is that the concept of 'destination' does not introduce superior possibilities for taxing corporate profit (or income). I arrive at this conclusion based on arguments directed against two different versions of the DCFT. 13 The first version proposes to tax corporate profits by apportioning such profits to the jurisdictions where corporate sales are made. 14 DCFT Version 1 most directly captures the intuition that corporate profits may be taxed not in the countries of residence and source but, rather, in another type of jurisdiction, with distinct efficiency and distributional consequences. But it faces a detrimental dilemma arising from the fact that much of international trade consists of sales not to final consumers but, rather, to other businesses. The second version of the DCFT -the favoured version among DCFT proponents 15 -is similar to the standard destination-based value-added tax (VAT) in many respects. 16 I argue that DCFT Version 2 faces a different dilemma: either it creates unpalatable trade distortions or it simply fails to impose a tax on corporate profits. In addition, this version allocates revenue according to where shareholders, not where customers, reside, which belies the claim that a new dimension has been introduced into international tax design.
While clarifying the logical structure and limitations of DCFT proposals is the main intended contribution of this article, the article also makes two additional contributions. First, it highlights ways in which DCFT proposals make ad hoc and contentious assumptions about the relevance of neutrality, progressivity, and the inter-nation distribution of revenue to the design of international taxation. Second, the article offers a novel explanation of why it is difficult to incorporate information about consumer location into international tax design. 17 I argue that market transactions are much less likely to transmit information about Gamed' (2016) 152:3 Tax Notes 1060 (recognizing that the Republican proposal embodied DCFT Version 2 instead). Additional variants of DCFT proposals are set forth in Devereux & de la Feria, 'Destination-Based Corporate Tax,' supra note 3. Interested readers are directed to the working paper version of this article for a critical discussion of such variants. 14 This version of the DCFT bears strong resemblances to actual policy proposals for taxing corporate income (as opposed to cash-flow profit) by sales-factor apportionment. final consumers than they are to transmit information about ultimate shareholders. Thus, 'residence' is more promising than 'destination' (when both are understood as capturing information about natural persons) for dealing with problems arising from capital mobility.
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The article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the theoretical motivations for DCFT proposals and briefly provides some background on the standard, destination-based VAT, with which DCFT proposals can be usefully compared. Part II identifies some of the contentious assumptions underlying the framework adopted by DCFT proponents with respect to the norms of neutrality, progressivity, and inter-nation revenue distribution. Parts III and IV of the article analyze and criticize the two versions of the DCFT. Part V elaborates on the fundamental difficulty of introducing information about final consumption into the design of international taxation. Part VI suggests a fundamental explanation of this phenomenon in terms of the differences between financial and non-financial transactions in respect of their tendency to retain information about the mutual identities of transacting parties. A brief conclusion follows.
II Neutralities in the face of capital mobility: the basic set-up
The DCFT is intended to replace the income tax many countries currently impose on corporations. The idea of a cash-flow tax on business entities dates back to at least the United Kingdom's Meade report in the late 1970s.
19 A core idea of such a tax is that it allows a business's capital investments to be immediately deducted in computing its tax base, as opposed to being depreciated over time. 20 This is significant because a business in a competitive market maximizes its profit by increasing its investment up to the point where the marginal product of capital equals scholars, relies very little on information about final consumers in its application to cross-border transactions. 18 I argue in Part V that the international income tax systems in many countries successfully deploy at least some information about the ultimate shareholders of corporations (and the corporate holdings of individual investors). This points to a novel international tax reform option, namely formulary apportionment by reference to the residence of ultimate individual shareholders. Although this option is an inevitable implication of the arguments advanced here, elaborating it is beyond the scope of this article. Only a brief discussion will be given in Part VI. Therefore, the cash-flow tax allows businesses to match the marginal product of capital with the cost of capital, just as they would in the absence of a tax. It therefore imposes no distortion on businesses' marginal investment decisions.
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Various reasons have historically been offered for imposing a zero rate of tax on the normal return to capital. 23 However, the recent literature on corporate taxation has emphasized one such reason arising in the international context. When investors have access to a global financial market, any business in a small open economy can raise capital only at a price determined by the world market. Under this assumption, any tax imposed by the government of the small open economy on the normal return to investment will simply increase, by the amount of the tax, the required rate of return for investments in the country. This has two effects: it creates social inefficiencies by reducing the level of local demand for capital and, because perfectly mobile capital bears no burden of the tax, any tax collected is simply shifted onto the local immobile factors of production such as labour. Eliminating the tax would remove the social inefficiencies without affecting the government's ability to tax local immobile factors. 24 21 Consider a $100 investment made in year 0 that is expected to yield $5 in year 1, at the normal rate of return of 5%. The expensing of the $100 in year 0 produces a tax saving of $100*t (t being the tax rate) in year 0, which is worth $100*t*5% more in year 1. This offsets the tax imposed on the $5 earned in year 1. Thus, the investment return of $5 is effectively free from tax. 22 In the recent policy literature, the cash-flow corporate tax is usually presented alongside two close alternatives: a modification of the current corporate income tax that provides an 'allowance for corporate equity' (ACE), and another modification that involves a 'capital cost allowance.' See e. The motivation for the 'destination-based' aspect of the DCFT relies on the following further reasoning. 25 Multinational corporations (MNCs) actually face three, not one, margins in their investment decisions. They first make discrete decisions on where to locate production. 26 While many factors affect this decision, the relevant tax factor is the effective average rate of tax that would be borne by the returns from an investment as a whole. This average rate depends on the effective tax rate on marginal investment (which may be positive, zero, or negative), the tax rates on infra-marginal investments, and the proportions of the returns subject to each of the rates. Once the discrete decision of where to locate production is made, a second type of decision, how much to invest, is made and continues to be adjusted. This type of decision is affected by the effective marginal tax rate. Third and finally, once profits on investments are realized, corporate managers have choices about where to book the profits. This last decision is affected by the countries' statutory tax rates.
To illustrate the choices of MNCs along these three margins, consider the following stylized set-up, which involves four countries that play different roles in the international tax regime. 27 First, there is country O, in which a multinational locates its production, say through a company X incorporated in country O. Country O is often labelled the country of 'source' for company X's income or profits -it is where company X carries out its production. It can also be labelled the country of 'origin,' if the goods produced in it are exported for sale in another country. Second, there is a country of 'residence,' country R, which is where company X's ultimate individual shareholders -the ultimate claimants to company X's income -reside. 28 Country R may also happen to be the country where company X's ultimate corporate parent is incorporated or managed, but because the place of incorporation or management is increasingly mobile and tax-driven, it is the residence country (or countries) of 25 shareholders that is (are) more relevant. Third, there is a tax haven country, country H, with substantially lower statutory and effective tax rates than both countries R and O (for example, the tax rate may be zero). DCFT proponents point out that if the shareholders of company X have already decided to locate company X in country O, and if country O eliminates its tax on the normal return to corporate capital (for example, by adopting a cash-flow tax or one of its close relatives), tax factors will no longer affect company X's marginal decision about how much to invest in country O. However, tax can still distort choices on the first and third margins. Suppose, for example, that the MNC group to which company X belongs possesses a unique intellectual property that can be deployed in production anywhere in the world; in economists' terms, the group commands a form of firm-specific and mobile rent. The group may locate production either in country O or in other countries that have the same zero tax rate on marginal investments as country O but lower average tax rates (for example, they may have lower cash-flow tax rates). In this case, even if country O had the lowest cost of production than all other countries without considering tax, 29 the MNC group may still choose not to locate production in country O because it may be able to maximize after-tax rent by locating production elsewhere. Therefore, even a cash-flow tax, by being 'source' based, can still distort economic activities and lead to welfare loss. 30 Moreover, company X may be tempted to shift income resulting from production in country O to country H in order to lower the tax on its profits.
These distortions, DCFT proponents claim, can be removed if one implements the taxation of company X's cash flow profits by reference to a factor that company X cannot manipulate. Moreover, they suggest that one such factor is where the final consumers for the goods that company X produces reside. Most productive activities eventually end in the sale of consumable goods and services. The location of final consumers, though, is essentially a given for any MNC. Thus, if corporate profits can be taxed by reference to where the sales to final consumers generating the profits are made, 31 the MNC's decisions about where to locate its production and its profits will have no effect on its tax liability. The MNC should then make these decisions based only on real (that is, non- In terms of the stylized setup described above, DCFT proposals introduce a fourth country, the country of 'destination' (country D in Figure 1) -the country where company X's products are bought and consumed -into the picture. Under the current international tax system, only countries O, R, and H are regarded as have taxing rights over company X's income. But DCFT proponents argue that many of the intractable problems of the current system can be solved if company X's income or profit can be taxed in country D.
In engaging with DCFT proposals in their own terms, this article focuses on the question: 'what does it mean to introduce country D into the taxation of company X's profits?' However, many questions and objections can be raised against the foregoing normative framework itself, and a failure to address them could make any assessment of DCFT proposals difficult, even if readers follow through the analyses in Parts III and IV. Therefore, the next part of the article will consider some key questions regarding the normative benchmarks of the DCFT. Before doing so, however, I briefly lay out the basic mechanics of the standard VAT, with which DCFT proposals will be compared at several points later in the article. 32 B THE VAT: A USEFUL POINT OF REFERENCE Although many profess unfamiliarity with the VAT, in truth it is both one of the most widely adopted taxes as well as one of the easiest to understand. 33 It is much less complex, for example, than both the personal income tax and the corporate income tax. In its simplest (and many would say theoretically ideal) form, the VAT taxes the value of all sales of consumer goods and services to individual consumers at a single tax rate. It is, thus, most importantly, a broad-based tax on individuals' consumption purchases. 34 But the VAT is not collected by retailers from sales to individual consumers. Instead, it is collected in multiple stages, as illustrated in the following example. Suppose that (a) a farmer sells $20 worth of wheat to a grain mill; (b) the grain mill uses the wheat to produce $30 worth of flour and sells it to a baker; and (c) the baker, using this flour, produces $50 worth of bread and sells it to individual consumers. Suppose the VAT rate is 10 per cent. Under the VAT, the farmer is required to charge 10 per cent of VAT on his sale to the mill: the mill thus pays the farmer $20 for the wheat plus $2 of VAT. The farmer is required to remit the $2 to the government. 35 The grain mill, in turn, is required to charge 10 per cent VAT to the baker: it collects $30 for the flour and $3 of VAT from the baker. Because it has already paid the farmer $2 of VAT on the purchase of the wheat, the grain mill can claim an 'input credit' of $2 against the $3 of VAT that it collects from the baker and remit only the difference -$1 -to the government. Note that (i) the farmer's and the grain mill's remittances to the government -$2 and $1 -correspond to 10 per cent of their respective 'value added' ($20 and $10) and (ii), by this point, the farmer and the grain mill have collectively remitted $3 to the government, but neither is out of pocket themselves -the entire $3 is in reality collected from the baker. 36 Finally, the baker is required to charge VAT on its sales, collecting $5 of VAT from individual consumers in addition to the $50 tax-exclusive price. The baker, like the grain mill, can claim an input credit for the $3 that it paid on the flour purchase and is required to remit the difference of $2 (corresponding to 10 per cent of its 'value added') to the government. The net result is that the government has collected a total of $5 of tax from the farmer, the grain mill, and the baker. The $5 is exactly 10 per cent of the value of the sale to final consumers and could have been collected through a 10 per cent retail sales tax remitted by the baker alone. The VAT, however, allows the government to collect portions of the tax earlier, which in general better protects the government from tax evasion.
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For the purpose of this article, the only additional relevant features of the VAT beyond the basic mechanisms listed above are how cross-border transactions are treated. The standard VAT is 'destination based,' a term 35 I assume that the farmer does not purchase any input subject to the VAT for his production of wheat. Therefore, unlike the grain mill and the baker discussed below, he does not claim any 'input credit.' 36 In paying $2 of the VAT to the farmer, the grain mill is simply pre-paying a portion of the tax that it anticipates collecting from the baker. This prepayment is therefore credited against the $3 collected from the baker -this being the basic point of the concept of 'input credit. that usually denotes the following treatment of imports and exports. 38 First, suppose that the baker sells $50 of worth of bread to customers outside its country. Under the 'destination-based' VAT, 39 the baker does not have to charge any VAT on export sales. Moreover, because the baker collects no VAT on export sales, it may have no tax against which it could claim a credit for the $3 of VAT it had paid to the grain mill. In this case, it would get a refund of the $3 it had paid on the input purchase. This combination of not charging the VAT on export sales and getting a refund of the VAT paid on associated input purchases is called 'zerorating' in VAT terminology. 40 'Zero rating' essentially allows the price of exports to be unaffected by the VAT rate of the exporting country. 41 Second, for any goods imported (or for services purchased from foreign providers), the 'destination-based' VAT requires tax (imposed by the importing country) to be charged on the value of the import. Very often, the VAT is collected and remitted by the domestic purchaser instead of the foreign vendor. If the import purchase is made by an individual consumer, then the VAT works like a retail use tax (that is, it is remitted by the consumer, not the vendor). If the purchase is made by a business, the VAT charged on the import is creditable against the VAT charged on the business's future sales, just like input purchases that are not imported. The VAT thus treats imports and domestic purchases in the same way -a key reason why the VAT is consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements. Part V of this article will show that the DCFT Version 2 differs from the VAT in this respect and is inconsistent with WTO law. Some further implications of these essential features of the VAT will be drawn out in the following parts, to shed light on the mechanisms and consequences of the DCFT. III 
The normative framework of DCFT proposals
The earlier discussion presented the DCFT as a tax design that would allow the achievement of neutrality simultaneously on three margins of MNCs' investment decisions. However, it turns out that the neutrality criteria that this normative framework invokes are both ad hoc and insufficient to motivate the DCFT as compared to other policy alternatives.
38 See text accompanying infra notes 123-5 for a distinction between the economic meaning of the 'destination principle' and the legal meaning of a principle by the same name. 39 As discussed in Part V below, this traditional mechanism is based on the assumption that the foreign buyer is not an individual consumer but an importer business. DCFT proponents in fact also appeal to progressivity and the internation distribution of tax revenue as relevant normative considerations. But it can also be shown that either the DCFT is inferior to other policy alternatives in light of these additional considerations or the details of the DCFT do not deliver the promised normative outcomes. This part of the article explains some of these confusions in the normative benchmarks adopted by DCFT proponents, before a subsequent examination of the DCFT's technical details.
A DO NEUTRALITIES PROVIDE RELIABLE NORMATIVE CRITERIA?
Two points illustrate the ad hoc nature of the neutrality criteria cited by DCFT proponents. Consider, first, neutrality with respect to where to book corporate profits -the third margin of the MNC decisions described in the first Part of the article. Are real economic activities associated with decisions along this margin? Certainly, such decisions may require the implementation of tax planning and avoidance strategiesactivities that constitute social deadweight loss, the elimination of which is desirable. But there are other policy instruments for responding to tax planning and avoidance -for example, anti-avoidance rules adopted either on a unilateral or a multilateral basis. 42 It is not clear that fundamental changes to the tax base and the allocation of taxing rights, which is what DCFT proposals require, are necessary. And, putting wasteful tax avoidance aside, if no real economic activities are affected by the location of corporate profits, then such location decisions, being purely taxdriven, can only have distributional consequences. In this case, neutrality with respect to such decisions is a questionable goal: it is not clear what normative weight should be given to the revenue distributions resulting from decisions made when tax is neutral. Only some separate normative criterion about the appropriate distribution of tax revenues would permit such weighting. For example, one may believe that revenue should be collected in the countries where 'value is created' or that countries where consumers reside should be entitled to tax profits in the production of consumer goods. 43 These criteria, however, are not neutrality based. Second, if the locations of final consumption of the goods or services produced by particular firms are fixed and known, and if the firms' 42 Dharmapala, 'Base Erosion,' supra note 27. 43 Taxing corporate profit in the countries of 'value creation' is the general thrust of the OECD's BEPS project, but DCFT proponents are sceptical about the coherence of this criterion. As discussed in infra Part III.C, taxing profits in the countries of consumer residence is sometimes presented by DCFT proponents as the appropriate way of allocating revenue among countries, as an independent normative matter (i.e. aside from neutrality considerations).
profits can be taxed by reference to such locations, then, according to the assumption of DCFT proponents, MNCs cannot avoid the taxation of any part of their investment returns -be it the normal return to capital or economic rent. Therefore, the open-economy-based objection to taxing the normal rate of return on internationally mobile capital falls away. Whatever other considerations there are against taxing the normal return on capital (for example, potential distortions of individual saving decisions), the deadweight loss associated with the mobility of capital is no longer one of them. Therefore, the 'destination' aspect of the DCFT undermines the rationale of the 'cash-flow' aspect.
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These reflections cast doubt on the cogency of the neutrality criteria cited by DCFT proponents. It is indeed important to note that in the design of tax policy generally, neutrality with respect to various behaviour margins is not regarded as a reliable guide. 45 Instead, at least in the context of domestic tax policy design, the objective is normally thought of as maximizing social welfare, which often involves trading efficiency losses from behavioural distortions against distributional goals that may enhance social welfare. Where efficiency losses cannot be eliminated, the objective is to measure the size of deadweight losses and reduce them in the aggregate. Moreover, the measurement of deadweight loss needs to take into account pre-existing distortions. Some economists have applied this standard welfarist framework to the principles of international taxation. 46 In contrast, by continuing to propose (ad hoc) neutrality benchmarks, DCFT proponents sidestep the standard theoretical framework. Are there any reasons for thinking that these standard normative considerations cannot usefully be applied in the international tax context? Moreover, it is almost certain that the neutrality criteria described in Part II of this article do not adequately capture DCFT proponents' motivations. This is because even if such criteria are accepted as being useful, 44 To put it differently, DCFT proponents offer to cure two separate ills (distortions of the location of investment and of the extent of investment). However, if there exists a cure to the first ill (e.g. by taxing investment returns by reference to the place of consumption), the second ill would not even arise. Having to pretend that the second ill continues to be relevant implies that the cash flow taxation proposal is under-motivated. 
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(Summer 2017) UTLJ © UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS they do not specify a uniquely superior tax. It can be shown that the standard, destination-based VAT also achieves neutrality with respect to margins of corporate decisions described in the first part. 47 The basic intuition is simple. Since the VAT is a tax on consumption, investment decisions by both individuals and corporations are unaffected by the tax. 48 Given this fact, why should one not just regard the VAT as the international tax reform option and repeal the corporate income tax? This question is pertinent for both theoretical and policy reasons. From a policy perspective, the United States does not yet have a VAT, and its corporate income tax is widely regarded as badly in need of reform.
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Adopting the VAT to replace the corporate income tax is thus very much a relevant policy option. 50 Moreover, all countries considering the adoption of the DCFT must consider the basic problem that it is unlikely to be WTO compatible. 51 The VAT does not face such a problem. Thus, one needs to ask: on what grounds would DCFT proponents recommend the DCFT over the VAT?
B PROGRESSIVITY AND THE DCFT'S RELATIONSHIP TO INDIVIDUAL TAXATION
One answer that has been suggested to this last question is that the DCFT would be more progressive than the VAT. 52 This claim is correct, and its substantive basis will become clearer after the DCFT's technical details are discussed in Part V of this article. The basic intuition is that the DCFT taxes economic rent accruing to capital but does not tax any 47 Part VII infra discusses a form of formulary apportionment that taxes corporate profit by reference to where ultimate shareholders reside that has similar neutrality features. have both the VAT and the corporate income tax, it would not be politically feasible to raise VAT rates sufficiently to cover the revenue shortfall from the repeal of the corporate income tax, but it would be politically feasible to convert the existing corporate income tax into a cash-flow tax. It is far from clear why this would be the case. See Cui, 'House Republican Blueprint,' supra note 12 at 1426-7, for a discussion of how other countries might respond to the United States's adoption of the DCFT. economic return to labour, whereas the VAT taxes both. Assuming that a greater portion of the income of the rich is generated from returns to capital than is the case for the less rich, the DCFT results in greater progressivity in tax systems than the VAT. The problem is that the appeal to progressivity is, again, ad hoc. Other tax policy instruments can also increase progressivity. Is progressivity an accidental consequence of the DCFT or is it one of its fundamental aims? If the latter, is it not relevant that traditional corporate income tax may allow even greater progressivity than the DCFT (although at the cost of sacrificing neutrality)? How should any trade-off between progressivity and neutrality be evaluated? DCFT proponents discuss only neutrality (and the implied economic efficiency gains) when arguing for the superiority of the DCFT over the current corporate income tax, making no reference to progressivity. They then appeal to progressivity when justifying DCFT proposals against the advantage of the VAT. There appears to be no single set of normative standards against which all of the relevant tax design proposals are evaluated.
Related to this point is the fact that DCFT proponents have generally been vague about the relationship between the DCFT and individual taxation. Progressivity is meaningful only at the level of individuals. Thus, to introduce progressivity into the discussion of corporate tax reform, individual taxation must be taken into account. Indeed, a key traditional justification given for the corporate income tax is that it serves as a backstop to individual income taxation; it prevents individuals from indefinitely deferring the personal income tax by earning income through corporations. 53 A cash-flow tax on a firm, by contrast, allows the immediate expensing of all of the firm's capital investments. The firm can thus always earn a normal investment return without being subject to tax and is indifferent between paying tax earlier and later. 54 In other words, individual shareholders enjoy the benefit of perfect deferral on investments in a firm subject to the cash-flow tax. The tax, therefore, could not possibly be conceived as a way to deny individuals the advantage of deferral. In this case, what is the point of maintaining a tax on corporations? Why not simply tax individual shareholders?
Proponents of taxing corporations and other businesses on a cash-flow or similar basis have given diverse answers to these questions. David Bradford's 'X-tax,' for example, is simply a consumption tax that does not aim 55 More recently, Edward Kleinbard has proposed the business enterprise income tax (BEIT), which explicitly taxes only economic rent at the firm level and only the normal return to capital at the investor level. 56 The BEIT serves as a device to measure returns to capital from risk taking and economic rent, instead of the traditional role of preventing the deferral of income by shareholders. By being explicit about the tax treatment of shareholders, both Bradford and Kleinbard also leave it unambiguous that their proposed taxes apply to all business entities, not just corporations. In contrast to both of these proposals, Robin Boadway and Jean-Francois Tremblay have recently advocated a tax on corporate rent that is combined with the realization-based income taxation of shareholders. 57 They view shareholder-level taxation as essential to maintaining the progressivity of the tax system, but their proposed corporate tax does not serve as a backstop to individual taxation. Instead, such a tax plays a role that characterizes the traditional corporate income tax; it allows the country where economic rent is earned to tax foreign claimants to the rent. This is another key traditional justification for maintaining the corporate income tax. 58 In contrast to these other proposals to tax corporations on the cashflow (or similar) basis, DCFT proponents have not been explicit about what type of individual, shareholder-level tax they assume to be in place. It is likely, however, that their assumptions are similar to Boadway and Tremblay's -that individual shareholders are taxed on a realization basis. Indeed, the 2016 US House Republican blueprint for tax reform, which incorporated a version of the DCFT, 59 also proposed to tax US individuals on all of their investment income, including dividends and capital gains, at progressive tax rates. 60 Thus, not only is shareholder-level realization-based taxation retained, but the progressive taxation of 55 Bradford, 'The X Tax,' supra note 4. The X-tax operates like a VAT, except that wage payments are deducted by firms and separately taxed to the employees. The X-tax is also origin, and not destination, based. 56 Edward D Kleinbard, 'Reimagining Capital Income Taxation' (paper delivered at the Annual Symposium of the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Saïd Business School, Oxford, UK, 22 June 2015) (on file with the author). The BEIT implements the tax on corporate rent through a cost of capital allowance instead of immediate deductions for capital expenses, a distinction that is irrelevant for the purposes here. See supra note 22. 57 Boadway & Tremblay, 'Corporate Tax Reform,' supra note 22. 58 Ibid at 28, 49; Auerbach, Devereux, & Simpson, 'Taxing Corporate Income,' supra note 4 at 911. The DCFT relinquishes this effect of the corporate tax. 59 'A Better Way,' supra note 7. The version of the DCFT incorporated is Version 2, discussed in Part V below. 60 The proposal is similar to Canada's approach to taxing capital gains, which includes half of capital gains in taxable income and such taxable income subject to progressive rates. dividends and capital gains (which are currently taxed at flat rates) would also likely have a substantial impact on the progressivity of the US tax system. Against this background, it is unclear how much normative purchase the DCFT's greater progressivity relative to the VAT provides.
Why not rely on the personal income tax to achieve progressivity? To summarize, the DCFT cannot be seen as a device for protecting the integrity of the personal income tax (given that it carves the normal return of capital out of the corporate tax base and does not address the problem of shareholder deferral). At the same time, the DCFT differs from origin-based taxes on corporate rent in that foreign claimants to such rent are no longer taxed by the government where the rent arises. It is thus only tenuously related to the traditional corporate income tax.
61 Indeed, it is more compelling to see the DCFT as a variant of the VAT. But, in this case, even though the DCFT may still be an efficient revenue-generating device that has its independent rationale apart from the personal income tax, neither its neutrality properties, which it shares with the VAT, nor its (somewhat) greater progressivity, which pales against the personal income tax, offer any distinctive normative appeal.
C REVENUE DISTRIBUTION AMONG NATIONS
Another very different type of appeal that proposals for destinationbased taxation may hold is also not captured by the neutrality framework set out in Part II. This is the distributive consequences of allocating the right to tax corporate profits according to the place of final consumer sales. There certainly has been political interest in changing the allocation of international taxing rights among nations in this fashion. In response to the media exposure of the types of tax planning engaged in by companies like Starbucks, for example, 62 many are troubled by the following question: how could Starbucks not pay any tax in the United Kingdom (UK) when its sales to customers in its UK stores are generating so much profit? DCFT proponents have occasionally made reference 61 This conclusion is relevant to the DCFT's scope of application -whether the DCFT should apply only to corporate entities or to unincorporated business entities as well. This is an important question especially for US policy makers since businesses taxed on a flow-through basis accounted for 56% of taxable business profits in 2008. Toder & Viard, 'Major Surgery Needed,' supra note 49 at 5. For a discussion of the application of the DCFT to pass-through entities, see Cui, 'House Republican Blueprint,' supra note 12 at 1424-5. to this aspect of the international tax reform debate. 63 Even the US House Republican blueprint for tax reform, for example, claims that '[under] a destination-basis approach, tax jurisdiction follows the location of consumption rather than the location of production.' 64 However, intuitions about the appropriate distribution of tax revenue among nations represent the weakest part in existing normative conceptions of international taxation. Traditionally, income taxation on the basis of the residence of individual taxpayers is thought to be justified by the principle of 'ability to pay' -residents belong to a political community, and the fiscal burden of that community ought to be shared according to the ability to pay. 65 By contrast, income taxation on the basis of the source of income is thought to be just because of the 'benefits principle' -the government overseeing the jurisdiction in which the income arises maintains the environment in which income generating activities can be pursued, and this benefit warrants compensation in the form of taxation. 66 Yet even if one acknowledges the appeal of these principles, they merely suggest that revenue should be allocated among residence and source countries but do not provide how the allocation should be made. Moreover, there has been little theoretical elaboration beyond the basic statement of these principles: neither principle, for instance, has been incorporated into the standard welfarist framework used by economic analyses. 67 The intuition that the jurisdictions of consumer residence should be entitled to tax the profits of MNCs making sales into them is likely to rest on some version of the 'benefits principle.' But even if one gives the intuition some weight, it is still a large further step to claim that only the countries of consumer residence should tax corporate profits -for example, only the UK should tax Starbucks' profits arising from sales into the UK, which is what 'taxation by destination' implies. At most, the various intuitions suggest that the countries where goods are produced, where they are consumed, and where investors reside should share tax revenue. The lack of normative guidance on how such sharing should work also weakens proposals to allocate jurisdiction to countries of consumer residence. For the purpose of this article, noting the distributional consequences of allocating the right to tax corporate profits is important for distinguishing between DCFT Versions 1 and 2, which are discussed in the next two Parts. The novelty of DCFT proposals, as Part II anticipated, is introducing the country of consumer residence (country D in Figure 1 ) into the scheme of international taxation. This sense of novelty relies on the distinctness of country D from countries of residence and source (countries R and O). In particular, presenting the DCFT as a matter of taxing corporate profits by reference to consumer residence suggests that country D's tax policy -in particular, its tax rates -should affect MNCs' after-tax income and, ultimately, the after-tax investment returns of the MNCs' shareholders.
68 Moreover, a transfer should occur from the MNCs (such as company X in Figure 1 ) to country D's government.
However, if the effect of the DCFT is such that it simply changes consumer prices in country D but has no effect on either company X's aftertax income or the after-tax investment returns of company X's shareholders in country R, then the DCFT is no longer a tax on corporate income or profit. Moreover, if country D's choice of tax rates matters only because it is assumed that company X's shareholders reside in country D -that is, countries R and D turn out to be the same countrythen the claim that a new policy option is introduced obfuscates more than it illuminates. We will see in the next two parts that this is indeed an important objection to DCFT Version 2. Only DCFT Version 1 allows for the allocation of revenue to countries other than the countries of source and (investor) residence. This Part reviews DCFT Version 1, which can be simply described using the set-up laid out in the first Part of this article. 70 Consider company X, which is incorporated and engages in production in country O, but suppose that company X sells all of its products to consumers in country D. Suppose that company X's cash-flow profits can be accurately measured; capital expenditures, for example, are immediately deducted. 71 Under an 'origin-based' cash-flow tax, 72 such profits of company X would simply be taxed in country O, where company X's production is located. This is analogous to the 'source'-based income taxation of company X's income under the current international income tax regime -the source of active business income is where the business is carried out. Under the destinationbased cash-flow tax, by contrast, sales to final consumers in country D would be identified by country D's tax authorities. Such sales create a potential tax liability in country D for all vendors (domestic and foreign), including company X. Since the tax is not a tax on sales but, rather, on business profits, however, the extent of company X's tax liability in country D depends on company X's costs that are allocable to the sales in country D, even if they are incurred in country O. Under DCFT Version 1, country D would allow such deductions. If country O also adopts DCFT Version 1, country O collects no tax from company X since no sale to final consumers is made in country O. 73 Essentially, the profit that would have been taxed in country O under a source-(or origin-) based international tax regime is taxed in country D instead. This is the switch from source-to destination-based taxation. As explained in Part II, the main motivation for thus giving country D a tax base that used to belong to country O is that, if company X knows that the locations of the final consumers are the only thing that will determine the rates at which its profits will be taxed, it will not locate production in country O just because country O has a lower rate. It will also not try to shift profit out of country O -for example, to country H -since that will not prevent its profits from being taxed in country D. Moreover, since company X's tax base is measured on the cash-flow basis, the tax does not distort company X's marginal investment decisions. Finally, revenue is allocated from countries O to D -a distributional consequence orthogonal to the neutrality criteria, but which may give the DCFT independent appeal.
Despite achieving the neutrality objectives stated for the DCFT in general, and despite allowing a substantial reallocation of the distribution of revenue collected from cross-border transactions, DCFT Version 1 is not favoured by DCFT proponents and has been mentioned only in passing. 74 However, I discuss it first because it fits the rhetoric of DCFT proponents much better than DCFT Version 2 and is arguably the main reason why the DCFT is seen as introducing a new conceptual option to international tax design.
DCFT Version 1 can be evaluated by analogy to various proposals for taxing corporate income by formulary apportionment (FA) according to a sales-only factor. The idea of FA is that the overall profits of a group of related corporate entities should be allocated not according to the price of the transactions among them but, rather, according to factors such as the locations of assets, payroll, and sales that are independent of specific intra-group transactions. 75 The proposal to allocate corporate income by reference only to the sales factor (and not to assets and labour, which depend on decisions about where to locate production) has sometimes also been labelled 'destination-based taxation' in recent discussion, but it should not be confused with DCFT proposals. 76 The main difference between sales-factor-only FA proposals and DCFT Version 1 is that, under the latter, what is taxable in country D is company X's cash-flow profit and not income. the tax burden on corporate profit will again depend on the place of production (that is, the location of the user of purchased business input). Both sellers and buyers of intermediate goods and services can gain from reducing such tax, and the distortions of 'source-based' taxation will be reintroduced.
I will elaborate on these two horns of the dilemma in turn. Recall that the main motivation for the DCFT is that the locations of final consumers are relatively immobile. Yet how are these consumer locations to be identified for most corporate businesses that engage in world trade? In connection with the proposals to tax corporate income by sales-factor FA, Harry Grubert has persuasively suggested that this would be impossible for broad and important classes of goods and services such as industrial components, capital goods, commodities sold on organized exchanges (for example, agricultural products, metals, and petroleum), and business software. 79 As Grubert puts it, '[w]here is the consumer for with a jurisdiction, FA by a sales-only factor may not give rise to tax in that jurisdiction even if sales are made there. By contrast, DCFT Version 1 may be understood as explicitly recognizing the taxing jurisdiction of any country into which sales to final consumers are made, even in the absence of other forms of business nexus. 80 To give a sense of the proportion of the problem, Grubert notes that the Bureau of Economic Analysis data on US exports indicate that more than 66 per cent of 2012 US exports were either 'industrial supplies and materials' or 'capital goods.' 'Consumer goods' including pharmaceuticals accounted for less than 12 per cent. 81 However, proponents for destination-based taxation (whether of corporate income or corporate cash-flow profit) may persist in believing that linking intermediate suppliers with the place of final consumption is possible for two reasons. First, they may believe that the destination-based VAT already succeeds in making such linkage. Given that a real-world tax is already destination based, why can the income tax or cash-flow tax not also be destination based?
82 Second, it may be thought that the government can rely on taxpayers to use market information to make generalizations about the location of final consumption, even if the identification of such location may not be possible on a transaction-by-transaction basis. 83 An important goal of this article is to explain why these conjectures must be rejected. In Part VI, I explain how the mechanisms by which the destinationbased VAT is implemented in fact deploy no information about the place of final consumption. 84 Further, I argue in Part VII that information about final consumers is very unlikely to be transmitted through market mechanisms, and, therefore, any government requirement to gather such information is unlikely to be implementable. In sum, whether through particular examples or through more systematic reflections, this horn of the dilemma posed by intermediate sales can be shown to be inescapable.
The other horn of the dilemma for DCFT Version 1 is that allocating profits to the jurisdictions where intermediate sales are made easily creates economic distortions and opportunities for manipulation. This has also been convincingly demonstrated by Grubert in connection with the proposals to reform the corporate income tax using sales-factor-based 86 For instance, producers of a high-tech industrial component such as a microprocessor may earn high returns on their sales to assemblers, whereas the assembler may earn only a normal return. If the assembler sells into a high-tax country where consumers reside, only the normal return to the assembler is subject to tax. But if the assembler resides in a low tax country, the producer of the high-tech component would be subject to a low tax on its high returns if profits are allocated by the value of intermediate sales. A market preference could thus develop for such low return intermediate businesses towards the end of the production chain located in low tax jurisdictions. Similarly, producers of high profit capital goods will prefer to sell to lessors or manufacturers in low tax locations. The tax advantage may be so great that the company will have tax-motivated reasons to break the supply chain. Conversely, Grubert notes that, in the case of an exporter in a high tax country, there is an incentive for a company to have an integrated operation rather than buying components from independent suppliers. This is because the independent component seller would otherwise have been subject to high tax. If the exporter integrates, all of the profit could be taxed at tax haven rates. 87 Grubert's examples make the dilemma arising from intermediate sales concrete and vivid. The dilemma bears directly on DCFT proposals' basic idea of taxing corporate profits by reference to the location of final consumers. However, Grubert draws a different conclusion. He suggests that 'many of the problems [with proposals for destination-based income taxation] result from the fundamental incompatibility of income taxes, in which the timing of income and deductions through accruals and capitalizations is very important, and consumption tax concepts in which they do not play a role.' 88 The main 'consumption tax concept' he is referring to 85 See Grubert, 'Mismatch Made in Heaven,' supra note 79. Grubert argues that in general, 'income shifting under current law and a destination-based system are similar in that highly profitable companies earning excess returns from valuable intangibles have the greatest opportunities. The focus of tax planning changes from the choice of the production location and the manipulation of intercompany payments to the choice of sales locations. The methods companies will use depend in part on whether they produce a component, a capital good or a final consumer good.' 86 Ibid at 57. 87 Ibid at 58. Further examples offered by Grubert include using conduit (but unrelated) distributors, franchising, and outsourcing marketing (at 56-7). Avi-Yonah, 'Case for a Destination-based Tax,' supra note 4, questions whether MNCs will always be willing to give up control of distribution. The likelihood and degree of the distortions that Grubert identifies is certainly an empirical question, just like questions about whether MNCs are sensitive to source-country taxes. However, it is enough that Grubert's hypothetical scenarios are far from being empirically implausible. 88 Grubert, 'Mismatch Made in Heaven,' supra note 79 at 71. is presumably the concept of the place of final consumption -that is, 'destination.' However, since a corporate cash-flow tax, which does not involve 'accruals and capitalizations,' faces exactly the same dilemma of implementation if it is designed as a form of sales-factor apportionment, Grubert is clearly wrong to suggest that the core tension is between income tax accounting and finding the place of final consumption.
B THE NEED FOR MULTILATERAL COLLABORATION
A second challenge for DCFT Version 1 also relates to implementation. Company X, when faced with a tax on its profits imposed by country D, has incentives to over-state its costs in country O to reduce its tax liability. In order to verify that company X's stated costs in country O attributable to sales in country D are true costs, country D's tax authority presumably will need the cooperation of the tax authority in country O. By assumption, however, country O collects no tax from company X if it adopts DCFT Version 1. Country O's willingness to provide such information to country D would thus presumably be based on some kind of reciprocal arrangement. Moreover, since company X may be making sales to many countries, its costs need to be allocated to these sales. Multilateral international cooperation in tax administration thus seems necessary to implement DCFT Version 1.
The point of this observation is not to convey the judgment that such international cooperation is impossible in reality. Instead, the question is whether, if such a level of international cooperation is assumed to be feasible, DCFT Version 1 still retains any superiority to the current international tax regime (that is, whether any reform to adopt destination-based taxation is still necessary). Imagine, for example, that country O's tax authority agreed to provide information regard company X's profits to country R's tax authority. Country R's ability to enforce taxation of the worldwide income of its individual residents (including company X's shareholders) would then be much stronger than the ability of countries to do so currently. Country R would then be free to impose a high income tax rate on its residents, since individual residence is relatively immobile. 90 In the presence of an effectively enforced residence-based international tax system, company X will have little incentive to locate its 89 In other words, if the other versions of the DCFT can avoid the dilemma of intermediate sales faced by DCFT Version 1, we should not expect that it is because they attain a greater distance from income tax accounting than that first version. 90 As discussed in Part VI below, this is identical with the proposition that the locations of final consumers are relatively immobile. See Green, 'Future of Source-Based Taxation,' supra note 65 at 72-3, for a discussion of the administrative assistance required to implement international taxation based on individual shareholder residence.
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(Summer 2017) UTLJ © UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS production and profits in low tax countries, given that its ultimate shareholders will be paying the same residence country tax in any case. Two additional remarks can be made. First, note that the need for multilateral collaboration just described already assumes that country O has adopted DCFT Version 1. Previous commentators on proposals to implement the corporate income tax by sales-factor FA have tended to give more attention to a different coordination problem. If country O does not adopt this type of formulary apportionment and retains source-based taxation, company X's income would be taxed in both countries O and D. 91 Advocates for formulary apportionment have suggested that in this situation, country O is the country that will back down, since company X is more likely to leave country O and find an alternative country (including country D) to locate production than it is to stop selling to consumers in country D. Thus, country O's adoption of the DCFT can be expected to occur unilaterally without coordination. The adoption of the DCFT is, in the words of economists, 'incentive compatible.' 92 However, it is less clear why it is in the unilateral interest of country O to provide information to the tax authorities in countries D (or R). The problem of administrative cooperation is thus the harder problem for FA.
Second, the argument just given is that if effective administrative cooperation between countries is assumed, destination-based taxation would be no better than residence-based taxation.
93 But in Part VII, I will go further and argue that it is more likely for administrative cooperation to succeed between countries O and R than between countries O and D, given the underlying market mechanisms for information transmission. Residence-based taxation, therefore, will turn out to be not just no worse than destination-based taxation but also superior.
V DCFT Version 2: still a tax on corporate profits?
Given the obvious implementation challenges facing DCFT Version 1, it is not surprising that other versions of the tax have been advanced. The preferred version, which I call DCFT Version 2, was recently incorporated into the US House Republican blueprint for tax reform. It was succinctly summarized earlier by Alan Auerbach, Michael Devereux, and Helen Simpson: A more plausible alternative [than DCFT Version 1] would be to organize the tax in the same way as a destination-based VAT. Indeed, value added as measured by VAT is equal to the sum of economic rent and labour income. In a closed economy, a VAT which also gave relief for labour costs would be equivalent to an Rbased cash flow tax. All real costs, including labour costs . . . would be deductible from the tax base. In an open economy, a destination-based VAT which also gave relief for labour costs would be a destination-based, R-based, flow-of-funds tax. . . .
How would such a destination-based cash flow tax allocate costs between countries?
It would relieve those costs in the exporting country in which they were incurred. Just as for VAT, an exporting company would not be taxed on its exports. . . . Any VAT a company had already paid on intermediate goods would be refunded. A destination-based cash flow tax would need additionally to give a refund to reflect the cost of labour. A company which exported all its goods would therefore face a negative tax liability, reflecting tax relief for the cost of its labour. Table 1 , Rows 1-3 display these Overall, the cash-flow tax base is narrower by $60 than the VAT tax base, thanks to the deduction of labour costs. Under the origin-based tax, all net profits are taxed in the country of origin. Under DCFT Version 2, by contrast, the net tax base is the sum of a positive tax base in country D and a negative tax base in country O. Thus, under DCFT Version 2, the tax base of a company like company X is determined by the tax systems of different countries. In the country of sale (country D), only revenue is taken into account, which clearly over-states company X's profit. However, in the country of production (country O), all production costs (including labour costs) and capital expenditures are subtracted from the tax base. In contrast to DCFT Version 1, whether such costs are correctly stated is verified by country O's tax authority alone, without country D's involvement.
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Having described DCFT Version 2, I now describe a dilemma it faces. DCFT Version 2 either produces trade distortions (and, therefore, is 95 Company X and company Y's aggregate tax base in countries O and D is thus 100. 96 This may strike many readers as a counter-intuitive way of determining the tax liability of a company's profits: if any country wants to tax any taxpayer's profits, surely it has to take into account both the taxpayer's revenue and its costs. If one government (country D) looks only at revenue and the other (country O) looks only at costs, who is taxing the profit? As Part V.C below demonstrates, this intuitive objection to DCFT Version 2 is correct.
objectionable from both a social welfare and a legal perspective) or it does not describe a tax on company X's cash-flow profits.
B THE PROBLEM OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES: THE DILEMMA'S FIRST HORN
Suppose that company X produces (in country O) a unit of a good while incurring material costs of $20 and labour cost of $50. Suppose that the world producer price of the good is $60. (All prices are expressed in taxexclusive terms.) Company X's production of the good is thus unprofitable and loses $10 per unit in a competitive market. However, under DCFT Version 2, not only would company X recover all previous tax borne by its non-labour inputs, thus ensuring that the material cost is $20 and no more, but it should also get a grant for its labour cost. (This is a grant and not a refund because no previous tax had been paid on the labour input.) Suppose that country O's domestic tax rate is 20 per cent: company X would get $10 of grant from country O's government per unit produced, allowing company X to break even. In other words, the DCFT seems to have the effect of an export subsidy. Table 1 shows why this subsidy is not present under the VAT. In Row 5 (which depicts the VAT), company X's negative tax liability in country O simply offsets company Y's positive tax liability in country O. The subsidy under DCFT Version 2 (depicted in Row 6) results instead from the deduction of labour costs. 98 Similarly, consider country D, the country of destination, which imposes a tax on the full $100 of import from company X. If a chain of production and sale similar to the one depicted in Table 1 took place purely domestically in country D, then, like Row 4 depicting the origin-based cash-flow tax, country D would have had a tax base of $40. 99 It follows that imported goods are taxed more heavily under DCFT Version 2, with the effect of an import tariff (the magnitude of the tariff is increasing as the proportion of labour cost in the imported goods increases).
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One version of this objection to the DCFT has long been knownnamely that a DCFT would be in conflict with numerous WTO requirements, including the prohibition on export subsidies under the General 97 DCFT Version 2 also faces serious implementation issues arising from the export subsidy for labour. A discussion of these issues is omitted here. Interested readers are referred to Cui, 'House Republican Blueprint,' supra note 12 at 1422-5. 98 Note that company X's subsidy consists not only of its own labour cost but also that of country X's for a total of $60. 99 Origin-and destination-based taxes are identical in effect for purely domestic transactions (without imports and exports). 100 See Sullivan, 'Border Adjustments,' supra note 9 at 304, for a similar illustration. Tariffs and Trade. 101 However, it is important to recognize that (as the above example shows) the problem is substantive and not merely legal. If the DCFT creates distortionary trade subsidies and tariffs, they presumably should be viewed as undesirable, just as distortions of corporate decisions on locations of production and the intensity of capital investments are. The objection that the DCFT may run afoul of WTO law, in other words, should not be seen as an extraneous, practical difficulty but, rather, as a relevant critique in economists' own terms.
DESTINATION-BASED CASH-FLOW TAXATION
While DCFT proponents occasionally appear to recognize this issue, for the most part they have simply asserted that there is no export subsidy built into their tax. 102 Potential arguments for this position come in two varieties. First, DCFT advocates argue that any import tariff or export subsidy (including the implicit tariffs and subsidies such as one finds in the DCFT) will only have the effect of changing real exchange rates, if one assumes balanced trade in the long run. 103 That is, any export subsidy or import tariff would be neutralized in the long term by exchange rate adjustments. However, this is an inadequate answer to concerns about the DCFT's trade effects. All examples that seek to show that tariffs (or export subsidies) can be neutralized through exchange rate adjustments assume that the tariffs and subsidies are imposed/granted at a uniform ad valorem rate. This assumption ensures that the relative prices of a country's exports (or imports) are not affected by border adjustments, which therefore can be countered by a single exchange rate adjustment. But what if the border adjustments are not made at a uniform rate? As the example in Table 1 shows, the amount of subsidy that company X receives for its export depends on the proportion of labour cost in the product. Different producers thus could receive different amounts of subsidies for the same product, and different sectors will be subsidized to different extents, depending on the intensity of their labour usage. At best, one could see an exchange rate adjustment countering the average subsidy a country offers to its exported products (or the average tariff imposed on imports). Even after the adjustment, however, some products and industries will enjoy residual, above-average subsidies, and others will gain advantage against imports that face aboveaverage tariffs. All of these residual subsidies and tariffs are distortionary.
Second, DCFT proponents have occasionally suggested that the subsidy that the DCFT offers to labour employed in producing exported goods and services may cause the wage in the export sector (and those sectors that supply to the export sector) to rise. 104 That is, in the example given above, the wage subsidy would cause company X's cost of labour to rise from $50 to $60, and, thus, company X would ultimately suffer losses and exit from the market notwithstanding the export subsidy. In effect, the suggestion is that labour claims the entire benefit of the subsidy/grant for wage payments -it bears the full incidence of such a subsidy. 105 However, the theoretical and empirical validity of such an assumption about the incidence of a tax benefit on labour is again likely to be controversial.
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Any significant distortionary trade effect of DCFT Version 2 would constitute a strong objection to it as a policy proposal. However, in the remainder of this Part, I show that if theoretical assumptions are made such that DCFT Version 2 does not have distortionary trade effects, a different objection to DCFT Version 2 arises. 107 In particular, if it is assumed that the tax benefit granted to labour under DCFT Version 2 is fully incident on labour -it causes wages to rise by the full amount of 104 See Kristen Parillo, 'A Destination-Based Corporate Tax: An Alternative to BEPS?' (2015) 78 Tax Notes International 315 at 320 (quoting Michael Devereux as responding to the objection that the DCFT gives rise to an export subsidy by claiming 'prices would adjust -just like under a VAT'). 105 This assumption has not been elaborated in the existing literature on DCFT. In the formal model in Auerbach & Devereux, 'Consumption and Cash-Flow,' supra note 15, Auerbach and Devereux assume that when a country imposes a tax t on imports, wages and other prices will go up by tax t (at 20). There is no separate discussion of wage and the justification for assuming its rise along with other prices in the model. It is thus unclear whether cash-flow tax theorists assume that, as a general equilibrium consequence, wage for labour used for purely domestic production will rise because of the grant for labour used in exported production. Moreover, it is unclear whether an origin-based cash-flow tax would have a similar effect on wages. 106 The economic incidence of taxes on wages such as income and payroll taxes, and of tax benefits such as the earned income tax credit and incentives for employer hiring, is theoretically and empirically controversial. the benefit -then another important claim -that the DCFT is a tax on corporate profit -can be shown to be false.
C DOES IT TAX CORPORATE PROFITS? THE DILEMMA'S SECOND HORN
This alternative objection can be seen again by reference to the basic set-up described in Part II. Consider the question: does the tax rate in country O matter to company X under DCFT Version 2? Since what motivates DCFT proposals are the distortions of source-based corporate taxes, under which the tax rate in the country of production (country O) does matter, this is an obvious question to ask. On the face of it, company X's tax liability, as well as the nominal tax rate on its profit, will depend partly on the tax rate in country O and not just on the tax rate in country D. Consider the example in Table 1 . The tax liability of Exporter X in country O -in particular, the extent of its negative liability, or subsidy, from its exports -will depend on the tax rate in country O. Therefore, the aggregate transfer that company X makes to (or receives from) the governments of countries O and D will depend on the tax rate in country O.
However, if a further assumption is made, it will follow that company X's after-tax profit will always remain the same, regardless of the tax rate in country O. This is the assumption that the cost of company X's production will always adjust precisely with, and to the extent of, tax rate changes. Such an assumption is typically made, in the context of the VAT, for non-labour input. For example, if country O's tax rate is 10 per cent, the tax-inclusive cost of an input purchase (for example, the purchase from domestic supplier Y) would be $22 ($20 of tax-exclusive cost plus $2 of tax). When company X is rebated the $2 when it exports its products, its net cost of input purchase is $20. This will remain the case if country O's tax rate is raised to 15 per cent (company X's input purchase would involve a gross cost of $23, but it would receive a rebate of $3.) It is precisely by virtue of this assumption that the destination-based VAT is conceived to be neutral in respect of production location decisions. 108 For DCFT Version 2 to replicate this aspect of the VAT, it must assume in addition that changes in the rate at which labour input generates subsidies fully translate into changes in the wage rate. As discussed above, it might be assumed that a 20 per cent subsidy will cause the cost of labour to rise from $50 to $60. In this case, country O's subsidy to company X generates no changes to company X's (labour and non-labour) production costs and, therefore, no distortions to its location decisions.
However, even if we accept this additional assumption (such that the incidence effects of DCFT Version 2 are analogous to the VAT), it must be remembered that it is typically also assumed that in the country of sale, country D, the total price of company X's sales will adjust according to the tax rate in country D. For $100 of imported goods, if country D's tax rate is 15 per cent, the sales price will be $115. If country D's tax rate is raised to 20 per cent, the sales price will be $120. But this means that neither country O's nor country D's tax rate affects company X's aftertax profit. This is the right property for the VAT to display, since the VAT only taxes consumption. But it undermines DCFT Version 2's claim to be a tax on company X's profits: a tax on corporate profit must alter the amount of profit accruing to the company's shareholders. If a given tax only changes the prices of a company's inputs and outputs (and the amounts of its tax payments), without changing its after-tax profits, then the tax does not bear on profits in the normally understood sense.
This discussion vindicates the sense of bewilderment that some readers may have already experienced. 109 How can any country tax a business' profit when it knows either only the revenue or only the cost side of the business' operations? Presumably, the idea of DCFT Version 2 is that countries O and D's tax policies would have this result in the aggregate, even when the two countries act independently, and, indeed, each of them has information about only one of the two components that go into the profit calculation. But the closer examination suggests that DCFT proponents, by assuming all effects of country O's and country D's taxes to be reflected in input (including labour) and product prices, have assumed away any possibility for such taxes to affect company X's profit. Company X's profit bears no incidence of either country O's or D's tax. This suspicion is supported by the more theoretical derivation of the properties of the DCFT offered by Alan Auerbach and Michael Devereux.
110 Through a two-country model, they conclude that the 'destinationbased tax is equivalent to a lump sum tax on the pure profits received by domestic residents.' 111 This claim makes straightforward sense: a regular destination-based VAT imposed by country D would tax all consumption by the residents of country D, whether such consumption is financed by economic rent or labour income and regardless of where such rent and labour income are generated. A DCFT that further excluded labour compensation from its tax base would then be equivalent to a tax on domestic consumption financed by economic rent accruing to capital. The problem, however, is that in Auerbach and Devereux's model multinationals are equally owned by resident and non-resident individuals. If a DCFT imposed by country D is equivalent only to a lump sum tax imposed on the profit accruing to the capital owned by country D's own individual residents, then the tax is not a tax on the profit of the multinational making sales into country D, since the non-resident owners do not bear the burden of the tax.
To put it differently, in Auerbach and Devereux's model, if country D adopts a DCFT, it imposes a tax on the corporate profits of foreign companies only insofar as its residents' consumption is financed (partly) out of such profits. If a foreign company's sales to final consumers in country D give rise to profits, but such profits do not finance consumption in country D, then country D imposes no tax on that foreign company's profits. DCFT Version 2, thus, is a tax on company X's profits depending on where the consumption financed by company X's profits takes place. In terms of the Figure 1 set-up, country D succeeds to tax company X's profit not because company X sells to country D but, rather, because for some of company X's ultimate individual owners, the country of residence, 'country R,' happens to be just country D. This belies the claim that country D succeeds to impose a tax on company X's profit by virtue of the fact that company X makes sales to consumers there. No part of company X's profit is allocated to country D, any more than such profit is allocated to country O, unless company X's ultimate shareholders reside in country D. 112 Therefore, one important normative promise of 'taxation by reference to destination' implicit in DCFT proposals is not being given appropriate weight. The distribution effects of DCFT Version 2 -in terms of the revenue allocable to different nations -is drastically different from the distribution effects of DCFT Version 1 (were the latter implementable).
113 If all countries adopt DCFT Version 2, the result would simply be a species of residence-based taxation of corporate profits. The countries hosting consumers but not shareholders will not get any greater piece of the pie that is the MNCs' profits. Moreover, even if the DCFT is neutral with respect to the MNC's investment decisions (provided that it does not distort trade through export subsidies and import tariffs), its progressivity, and its ability to transfer funds from corporate profits to governments, obtain only in the country of residence, not in the country of destination qua the country of destination.
VI Does introducing 'destination' expand the range of policy options?
Jointly, the preceding two parts of this article presented arguments that DCFT proponents have failed to describe a tax that is simultaneously (a) non-distortionary; (b) feasible; and (c) a tax on corporate profits. DCFT Version 1 cannot simultaneously satisfy (a) and (b), and DCFT Version 2 cannot simultaneously satisfy (a) and (c). These arguments underscore that the challenges of taxing corporate profits on a destination basis are fundamentally conceptual. This Part and the next one will further explore the implementation problem facing DCFT Version 1 and offer an intuitive explanation of why it is difficult to incorporate information about destination into international tax design.
To start, note that there is in theory a close affinity between residencebased individual income taxation and destination-based consumption taxation. 114 This affinity is not widely recognized, but it is easy to explain. It is typical to think of a tax on the return to savings as a schedule of taxes on future consumption, with the tax rates higher for acts of consumption that occur further in the future. 115 Thus, when a resident country chooses a tax rate on the capital income earned by its individual residents (which may be different from the tax rates chosen by other countries for their respective individual residents), it may be viewed as adopting a distinct set of future consumption tax rates for its residents. Destination-based consumption taxation, of course, is also a matter of setting distinct tax rates for acts of consumption that occur within different jurisdictions. Both residence-based capital income taxation and destinationbased consumption taxation thus can be thought of as determining crosscountry differences in consumer prices. 116 Conversely, source-based capital income taxation can be thought of as creating systematic differences across countries in producer prices -different source countries must generate different pre-tax returns in order to offer the same after-tax return to investors. This is also the effect of 'origin-based' commodity taxation.
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Given this affinity between residence-based individual income taxation and destination-based consumption taxation, one can ask: how can destination-based taxation fix problems in international taxation that cannot be fixed by residence-based taxation? In particular, the roles of individuals as residents of a given country and as consumers within that country essentially overlap. Indeed, in theorizing about consumption taxation, the country of 'destination' is often defined as the country where the consumers reside. It is also a premise of DCFT proposals that consumption activities are largely immobile. If a tax system can deploy information regarding individuals qua consumers, why should it not be able to deploy information regarding individuals qua residents?
The difficulty, even infeasibility, of the latter is the prevailing assumption made by those who theorize about international corporate taxation today.
118 It might be thought that the difference is that it is easier to identify the timing of consumption than the timing of income. But if the challenge of residence taxation is mainly about timing, then a variety of devices are available to deal with it. For example, interest may accrue on tax liabilities that are deferred. 119 Moreover, as noted in Part III, any proposal that removes the normal rate of return from the corporate tax base necessarily deprives corporate taxation of the ability to prevent shareholder deferral. Solving the problem of timing, thus, is simply not an objective for cash-flow tax proponents.
The challenge of residence-based individual income taxation must then be conceived as a matter of jurisdiction and enforcement. In particular, much of the foreign wealth of resident individuals may be held through foreign entities, and the resident country generally lacks jurisdiction either to tax these entities or to require them to provide information regarding income accruing to (or even just regarding assets indirectly 117 Because commodity taxation, including the VAT, normally disregards financial flows, the concept of the 'origin' of a taxable supply under the VAT and other commodity taxes is generally narrower than the concept of 'source' of income under income taxes, since 'source' is a concept used to allocate taxing jurisdiction for income from labour as well as from financial capital, in addition to income from businesses. held by) the country's own residents. However, these same jurisdictional and enforcement constraints also hold in the indirect tax context -the current international consumption and income tax regimes apply to the same patterns of world trade and investment. Nonetheless, DCFT proponents seem to believe that the current international consumption tax regime is somehow better able to gather information about consumers from these patterns than the income tax regime is able to gather information about residents. They appear to take the position that while the prevalent practice under the VAT for taxing cross-border transactions, which is 'destination-based,' is still imperfect at identifying the place of consumption, it does succeed in doing so to enough of an extent that incorporating similar information about destination into the corporate tax may expand the range of policy options. 120 In the lingo favoured by these authors, destination, a concept deployed in indirect taxation, can serve as a 'proxy' for the place of consumption.
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Yet this purported benefit of introducing the concept of destination is illusory. The error committed can be described in two ways. First, a distinction should be drawn between the economic characterization of the 'destination principle' and the institutional/legal characterization of a principle by the same name. These are in substance two entirely different principles. According to the economic characterization, the destination principle 'means that the total tax paid in relation to a commodity is determined by the [tax] rate levied in the jurisdiction of its final sale . . . [and] that all the revenue accrues to the government in the jurisdiction where that sale occurs.' 122 Understood this way, the destination principle can be implemented not just through the VAT but also through a retails sales tax (under which sales and only sales to final consumers are taxed at the rate of the country of residence of the consumers).
123 That is, the 'destination principle' in the economic sense can be perfectly realized if all business-to-business (B2B) transactions are ignored. Yet if the destination principle, in this economic sense, had been implemented by a retail sales tax, we would not know the destination principle as it is normally understood, institutionally and legally, in 120 Devereux & de la Feria, 'Destination-Based Corporate Tax,' supra note 3. Again, what is purportedly relevant is that information about place of consumption is introduced into the tax regime and not how the information is used (for example, whether to tax consumption or to allocate taxing right on corporate profits connection with the VAT -that is, the zero-rating of exports and the taxing of imports. 124 However, the identification of 'destination-based' taxation with the institutional mechanism of zero-rating exports is transparently assumed in DCFT Version 2.
Second, while there are particular rules under the VAT laws of different countries that attempt to identify the place of individual final consumption, it would be erroneous to assume that this is what the VAT 'place-of-supply' or 'place-of-consumption' rules do in general. Generally, VAT rules implement a tax on consumption not by identifying consumption activities but, rather, by identifying the opposite -namely, business activities. In technical terms, what is crucial to the VAT is not the imposition of tax on sales but the allowance of deductions for input purchases to businesses. As a general matter, both sales to business and to individual consumers (that is, B2B and B2C transactions) are subject to tax, but only businesses can claim deductions. And because consumption activities generally do not qualify as businesses and, therefore, do not give rise to deductions, they end up bearing the burden of the VAT. The legally intensive effort to delineate between consumption and nonconsumption under VAT laws takes the form chiefly of distinguishing between business and non-business activities on the side of the purchaser, not of distinguishing, on the part of the seller, between different types of sales. It is within this general context that zero-rating under the VAT operates. Indeed, the mechanism of zero-rating is often adopted under VATs within purely domestic contexts. 125 The point of such mechanisms is generally to ensure there is no tax-induced distortion in the business decisions of the purchaser. Zero-rating in the cross-border context serves exactly the same function -namely, avoiding distortions in B2B transactions, not taxing final consumption.
How, then, have the zero-rating of exports and the taxing of imports for B2B transactions resulted in final consumption being taxed largely where it occurs? First, relatively few consumer goods traditionally have been directly imported by retail customers; most of the importation of goods has involved B2B transactions. Second, most consumption services are traditionally supplied domestically. These two facts have allowed a set of rules mainly governing cross-border B2B transactions to work. But where either goods or services are supplied cross-border directly to final consumers, the enforcement of the VAT becomes much more challenging, and the VAT has no advantage over the retail sales tax in relation to such supplies. Indeed, for the cross-border supply of services to final consumers, the destination principle -understood in the economic sense -has, at least up until now, been largely unenforceable. It is thus inaccurate to suggest (as the idea of 'destination as proxy' does) that somehow the destination principle as embodied by the VAT has already incorporated information about the place of final consumption.
The preceding arguments make references to VAT law to explain why VAT mechanisms cannot be plausibly viewed as embodying 'proxies' for the location of consumption. There is an even more intuitive argument. 'Destination,' as used under VAT law, simply denotes the location of the customer in cross-border transactions. However, if one-third of international trade takes place between related entities in multinational groups, 126 and if in countries like the United States over 90 per cent of imports flows through only a sub-group of firms, 127 'the customer' in a cross-border transaction is only in a very small percentage of cases an individual consumer. How then could we expect the concept of destination, which corresponds to the location of all customers, to be a proxy for the place of final consumption? 128 This is not to deny that governments and specialists in VAT design have been working to develop rules and administrative practices that would more successfully tax cross-border B2C transactions (whether on a destination or origin basis).
129 Such rules and practices will likely incorporate more information regarding the place of final consumption than do traditional VAT rules. Such relatively recent efforts, however, pale in comparison with the massive resources that governments and taxpayers have for half a century poured into, and continue to pour into, developing rules and administrative infrastructures for residence-based income taxation of individuals. I have in mind US-controlled foreign corporation (CFC) and passive foreign investment company rules, and their To clarify, what is at issue in the preceding arguments is not whether VAT mechanisms deploy sufficient information so as to always identify places of consumption. It is instead whether basic VAT mechanisms deploy any identifying information regarding places of consumption. If they do not, DCFT proponents have yet to offer a single example of a mechanism that links a specific instance of corporate production with ultimate consumer purchases in another country.
counterparts in Canada, Australia, Germany, France, and other countries, 130 as well as more recent efforts by governments to collect information regarding offshore accounts that require the disclosure of beneficial ownership that look through corporations. That is, real world income tax systems already deploy a lot of information regarding, for given individuals, what foreign corporations own and, for given corporations, what foreign shareholders they have. Such information is also widely deployed in financial regulations outside the income tax. In the next Part, I explain why this may not be accidental and why it has a surprising implication for reforming international corporate taxation. VII The information superiority of residence-based taxation By its nature, the VAT applies only to the supply of goods and services. Reflection suggests that the sale and purchase of goods and services generally transpire in such a way that parties need not know the identities of their counterparties or, in any case, do not retain the information about such identities. 131 The identities of transacting parties are relevant only when such transactions implicate particular types of legal relationshipsfor example, the relationship of agency. If any information is retained (think of the simple store receipt), it tends to be information about the seller, which is kept by the buyer, not the other way around. 132 In contrast, it seems that by their nature, the establishment of financial claims, including debtor-creditor relationships and equity ownerships, generally requires the knowledge of mutual identities. Parties that have financial claims against one another generally do not remain anonymous. Where they do, they are connected through a chain of non-anonymous agency relationships. 133 The difference, in respect of the maintenance of identity (or anonymity) of transacting parties, between non-financial transactions and transactions establishing financial claims probably originates from the simple fact that financial claims by definition persist over time. The parties need the identities of their counterparties to locate them later on. 134 Similarly, transactions in goods and services require the keeping of identities only insofar as they create claims over time (for example, a warranty for defective products).
If the foregoing reflection is sound, then it explains why the VAT transmits no information about final consumers. Even sellers making sales to final consumers directly in person generally know very little about their customers -whether they are buying for final consumption, where they reside, or what their other personal characteristics are. Ipso facto, such information cannot be transmitted by the immediate sellers to upstream sellers. The difficulty of envisioning and tracing intermediate sales to final consumption has its fundamental root here. It is true that governments can require sellers to obtain information about buyers, and sellers can conduct market surveys about who their customers are. But obtaining information about customers either individually or collectively is, most of the time, not an intrinsic part of, but, rather, an addition to, transactions in goods and services. Such information gathering introduces costs that are not originally present on market activities.
By contrast, share ownership is a type of financial claim, and, therefore, the basic market conditions for the transmission of mutual identities (either from corporations to shareholders or from shareholders to corporations) are always present, regardless of whether governments impose any requirement to gather such information. All that the government has to do in tax and financial regulations is to harness such information. It may be that a regulatory regime at a given point in time does not harness such information. But, at the present, we do not know whether this might not be just a contingent fact that happens to characterize a changing regulatory system at the present time. There is little dispute that a listed company is connected to its ultimate shareholders through a chain of nonanonymous relationships. 135 Some parties in the chain may have incentives not to transmit the information they possess to the government or other parties: harnessing the information is a matter of changing such incentives. But it is not about making market participants collect information that they would not otherwise have any use for. If this is correct, then a fundamental conceptual question is whether corporate profits should be taxed by reference to information embodied in financial claims or information pertaining to the sales of goods and services. The residence of shareholders is an example of the former. The location of consumers ('destination') is an example of the latter. Since individuals' residence and their place of consumption largely overlap, the choice between residence and 'destination' essentially boils down to which is the most effective channel of transmitting the same information. The foregoing discussion implies that the more plausible answer is residence, not 'destination.' Evidence from real world tax systems is consistent with this assessment: on the one hand, the VAT relies little on information about the location of final consumers; on the other hand, income tax systems designed to prevent the deferral or evasion of obligations to report foreign income try precisely to connect assets and income with their claimants.
Why, then, has individual residence-based taxation generally been assumed to be infeasible in recent corporate tax reform proposals, whereas proposals for destination-based taxation is able to command interest and attention? One possible explanation is that taxing corporate profit by reference to residence can be understood in two different ways. The first, more traditional understanding is to tax individual shareholders on income earned through (domestic and foreign) corporations. 136 To do so, the government must possess two kinds of information: first, where (that is, in which foreign countries) the individual shareholder has assets and income and, second, how much income the individual has from each source. The first type of information pertains to the identities of parties involved in chains of financial claims (and agency relationships). Therefore, gathering it is, as argued above, a matter of the government harnessing information the market already has (though possibly against the resistance of tax evaders and third parties willing to assist such evaders for a profit). The second type of information pertains to the substance of the financial claims themselves and not just the identity of the transacting parties. The purported impracticality of taxing individual shareholders on a residence basis has had to do as much with the second type of information as the first. The challenges relating to the gathering of this second type of information have not dissuaded all from residence-based shareholder taxation, but they seem to have done so to many. 137 136 Note that the basic assumption of this understanding is that individuals should be taxed on an accrual basis under an income tax. Taxing individuals when they receive dividend distributions from foreign corporations would raise no difficulty of implementation. 137 Toder & Viard, 'Major Surgery Needed,' supra note 49 at 42, makes exactly such a proposal to tax shareholders on an accrual basis (either through mark to market or However, there is an alternative way of understanding the notion of taxing corporate profit by reference to residence. On this second understanding, corporations are the taxpayers, and how their income or profit is taxed should depend on the residence of the corporations' ultimate shareholders. If corporate income or profits can be taxed in this way, then the neutrality criteria that motivate the DCFT can be satisfied. For such taxation to be feasible, only information about the identities -or, even more narrowly, the tax residence -of the shareholders is needed. There is no need to apportion income or profits to individual shareholders. For this approach to work, in other words, only the first of the two types of information that the traditional approach of residencebased individual taxation relies on is needed. Presumably, its feasibility is correspondingly greater than the traditional approach.
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Assessing the merits and implementability of the idea of taxing corporate profits by residence-based FA is beyond the scope of this article. There are many reasons for not rushing into such an exercise. As this article's discussion of DCFT proposals has shown, present academic discussions of reforming international corporate taxation are characterized by certain fundamental disagreements, or at least diverging assumptions, that theorists have not tried to reconcile. Some of these diverging assumptions concern normative criteria. Production efficiency, progressivity, and, possibly, revenue distribution among countries all seem to matter somewhat, but there is no general normative framework into which all of these considerations fit. 139 In addition, divergent assumptions about the incentives of countries are also often made. Is it feasible for countries to provide mutual administrative assistance in tax collection, and again, under what conditions?
140 When do countries cooperate and when do they act purely strategically?
141 These fundamental uncertainties make any positive policy proposal difficult to evaluate. through flow-through taxation). For an earlier discussion, see Green, 'Future of Source-Based Taxation,' supra note 65. 138 Ibid at 25: 'A potentially even more attractive method would allocate the corporation's income in proportion to where its stockholders reside. We are not aware of any literature that discusses this approach and we are not sure whether it would be practical . . .
[The] problems may not be insurmountable and we recommend further efforts to examine whether and how such an allocation method could be made operational.' 139 See supra Part III. 140 See supra Part IV.B. 141 Moreover, strong empirical assumptions are also often made regarding the incidence of various taxes. This article has carried out a critical appraisal of DCFT proposals in two ways. First, the adoption of improvised normative benchmarks has made DCFT proposals especially difficult to assess from traditional tax policy perspectives; this article exposes the nature of some of the (deliberate) confusion. 142 After acknowledging their emphasis on neutrality with respect to three margins of MNCs' investment decisions (that is, where to locate production, how much to invest, and where to book profits), I noted that the implied neutrality criteria are ad hoc and, in any case, are not sufficient to motivate the DCFT, given that the standard VAT already satisfies all of them. 143 Since the DCFT lacks some of the key properties of the traditional corporate income tax (for example, it does not backstop individual taxation, and it does not tax foreigners on profit earned domestically), using the neutrality criteria to motivate the DCFT as opposed to the VAT seems unsatisfactory. And while the DCFT may be more progressive than the VAT, the significance of this is unclear if the individual income tax is in place. 144 All of these critiques apply to both DCFT Versions 1 and 2. Their thrust is that even if DCFT proposals are internally coherent and feasible, their 'normative score' is only modest by the traditional criteria for evaluating international taxation.
The second way in which this article has evaluated DCFT proposals is to explore the internal coherence of DCFT proposals. This involved taking DCFT proponents on their own terms as much as possible. In particular, I focus on one distinct promise of the DCFT, namely to tax corporate profits by reference to the place of final consumption -and, by implication, to shift the resulting tax revenue from the countries of residence/ source to the countries of destination. I showed that DCFT Version 1 is consistent with this promise but is infeasible. Moreover, this 'administrative' infeasibility is not accidental but, rather, may be theoretically traceable to the fundamental fact that information about final consumers is most of the time not transmitted through market mechanisms. I then showed that DCFT Version 2 could not deliver this promise if it were to avoid the objection that, unlike the destination-based VAT, it risks creating significant trade distortions. That is, even just for the DCFT Version 2 to be put on par with the VAT in terms of efficiency properties (let alone 142 This practice of adopting ad hoc benchmarks is not uncommon in recent academic discussions of international tax reform. The theoretical discourse on reforming international taxation, in other words, has taken on some of the inconsistent, rhetorical character that academics tend to criticize in the policy discourse surrounding BEPS. improve on it), one must give up the idea that it is a tax on corporate profits. Overall, the version of the DCFT that is coherent and novel in its promises (that is, Version 1) is infeasible, while the version of the DCFT that is feasible (that is, Version 2) does not introduce any interesting new policy options to international taxation. This is admittedly a complex set of arguments. The complexity results at least in part from uncertainties about the appropriate normative framework and behavioural assumptions for evaluating international tax regimes. Such uncertainties arguably characterize all existing academic analysis of international taxation. They diminish the potential of any proposal for reforming the international tax system to guide real world action. Ironically, the outcomes of the OECD's BEPS project may end up helping theorists to calibrate their behavioural assumptions and the weight they assign to various normative goals, thereby enhancing the likelihood of the theory to provide guidance to policy and action in the future.
